Computational Models of Interoception and Body Regulation

To survive, organisms must effectively respond to the challenge of maintaining their physiological integrity in the face of an ever-changing environment. Preserving this homeostasis critically relies on adaptive behavior. In this review, we consider recent frameworks that extend classical homeostatic control via reflex arcs to include more flexible forms of adaptive behavior that take interoceptive context, experiences, and expectations into account. Specifically, we define a landscape for computational models of interoception, body regulation, and forecasting, address these models' unique challenges in relation to translational research efforts, and discuss what they can teach us about cognition as well as physical and mental health

Piercing of Consciousness as a Threshold-Crossing Operation

Many decisions arise through an accumulation of evidence to a terminating threshold. The process, termed bounded evidence accumulation (or drift diffusion), provides a unified account of decision speed and accuracy, and it is supported by neurophysiology in human and animal models. In many situations, a decision maker may not communicate a decision immediately and yet feel that at some point she had made up her mind. We hypothesized that this occurs when an accumulation of evidence reaches a termination threshold, registered, subjectively, as an “aha” moment. We asked human participants to make perceptual decisions about the net direction of dynamic random dot motion. The difficulty and viewing duration were controlled by the experimenter. After indicating their choice, participants adjusted the setting of a clock to the moment they felt they had reached a decision. The subjective decision times (tSDs) were faster on trials with stronger (easier) motion, and they were well fit by a bounded drift-diffusion model. The fits to the tSDs alone furnished parameters that fully predicted the choices (accuracy) of four of the five participants. The quality of the prediction provides compelling evidence that these subjective reports correspond to the terminating process of a decision rather than a post hoc inference or arbitrary report. Thus, conscious awareness of having reached a decision appears to arise when the brain’s representation of accumulated evidence reaches a threshold or bound. We propose that such a mechanism might play a more widespread role in the “piercing of consciousness” by non-conscious thought processes.The research was supported by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and National Eye Institute grant R01 EY11378 to M.N.S., the Human Frontier Science Program to D.M.W. and M.N.S., the Wellcome Trust and Royal Society (Noreen Murray Professorship in Neurobiology) to D.M.W., National Eye Institute grant T32 EY013933 to Y.H.R.K., and the René and Susanne Braginsky Foundation and University of Zurich to F.H.P

Reducing bias in auditory duration reproduction by integrating the reproduced signal

Duration estimation is known to be far from veridical and to differ for sensory estimates and motor reproduction. To investigate how these differential estimates are integrated for estimating or reproducing a duration and to examine sensorimotor biases in duration comparison and reproduction tasks, we compared estimation biases and variances among three different duration estimation tasks: perceptual comparison, motor reproduction, and auditory reproduction (i.e. a combined perceptual-motor task). We found consistent overestimation in both motor and perceptual-motor auditory reproduction tasks, and the least overestimation in the comparison task. More interestingly, compared to pure motor reproduction, the overestimation bias was reduced in the auditory reproduction task, due to the additional reproduced auditory signal. We further manipulated the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the feedback/comparison tones to examine the changes in estimation biases and variances. Considering perceptual and motor biases as two independent components, we applied the reliability-based model, which successfully predicted the biases in auditory reproduction. Our findings thus provide behavioral evidence of how the brain combines motor and perceptual information together to reduce duration estimation biases and improve estimation reliability

Temporal regularity of the environment drives time perception

It’s reasonable to assume that a regularly paced sequence should be perceived as regular, but here we show that perceived regularity depends on the context in which the sequence is embedded. We presented one group of participants with perceptually regularly paced sequences, and another group of participants with mostly irregularly paced sequences (75% irregular, 25% regular). The timing of the final stimulus in each sequence could be varied. In one experiment, we asked whether the last stimulus was regular or not. We found that participants exposed to an irregular environment frequently reported perfectly regularly paced stimuli to be irregular. In a second experiment, we asked participants to judge whether the final stimulus was presented before or after a flash. In this way, we were able to determine distortions in temporal perception as changes in the timing necessary for the sound and the flash to be perceived synchronous. We found that within a regular context, the perceived timing of deviant last stimuli changed so that the relative anisochrony appeared to be perceptually decreased. In the irregular context, the perceived timing of irregular stimuli following a regular sequence was not affected. These observations suggest that humans use temporal expectations to evaluate the regularity of sequences and that expectations are combined with sensory stimuli to adapt perceived timing to follow the statistics of the environment. Expectations can be seen as a-priori probabilities on which perceived timing of stimuli depend

A nonlinear updating algorithm captures suboptimal inference in the presence of signal-dependent noise

Bayesian models have advanced the idea that humans combine prior beliefs and sensory observations to optimize behavior. How the brain implements Bayes-optimal inference, however, remains poorly understood. Simple behavioral tasks suggest that the brain can flexibly represent probability distributions. An alternative view is that the brain relies on simple algorithms that can implement Bayes-optimal behavior only when the computational demands are low. To distinguish between these alternatives, we devised a task in which Bayes-optimal performance could not be matched by simple algorithms. We asked subjects to estimate and reproduce a time interval by combining prior information with one or two sequential measurements. In the domain of time, measurement noise increases with duration. This property takes the integration of multiple measurements beyond the reach of simple algorithms. We found that subjects were able to update their estimates using the second measurement but their performance was suboptimal, suggesting that they were unable to update full probability distributions. Instead, subjects’ behavior was consistent with an algorithm that predicts upcoming sensory signals, and applies a nonlinear function to errors in prediction to update estimates. These results indicate that the inference strategies employed by humans may deviate from Bayes-optimal integration when the computational demands are high

Optimal perceived timing: integrating sensory information with dynamically updated expectations

The environment has a temporal structure, and knowing when a stimulus will appear translates into increased perceptual performance. Here we investigated how the human brain exploits temporal regularity in stimulus sequences for perception. We find that the timing of stimuli that occasionally deviate from a regularly paced sequence is perceptually distorted. Stimuli presented earlier than expected are perceptually delayed, whereas stimuli presented on time and later than expected are perceptually accelerated. This result suggests that the brain regularizes slightly deviant stimuli with an asymmetry that leads to the perceptual acceleration of expected stimuli. We present a Bayesian model for the combination of dynamically-updated expectations, in the form of a priori probability of encountering future stimuli, with incoming sensory information. The asymmetries in the results are accounted for by the asymmetries in the distributions involved in the computational process

Piercing of Consciousness as a Threshold-Crossing Operation

Many decisions arise through an accumulation of evidence to a terminating threshold. The process, termed bounded evidence accumulation (or drift diffusion), provides a unified account of decision speed and accuracy, and it is supported by neurophysiology in human and animal models. In many situations, a decision maker may not communicate a decision immediately and yet feel that at some point she had made up her mind. We hypothesized that this occurs when an accumulation of evidence reaches a termination threshold, registered, subjectively, as an “aha” moment. We asked human participants to make perceptual decisions about the net direction of dynamic random dot motion. The difficulty and viewing duration were controlled by the experimenter. After indicating their choice, participants adjusted the setting of a clock to the moment they felt they had reached a decision. The subjective decision times (tSDs) were faster on trials with stronger (easier) motion, and they were well fit by a bounded drift-diffusion model. The fits to the tSDs alone furnished parameters that fully predicted the choices (accuracy) of four of the five participants. The quality of the prediction provides compelling evidence that these subjective reports correspond to the terminating process of a decision rather than a post hoc inference or arbitrary report. Thus, conscious awareness of having reached a decision appears to arise when the brain’s representation of accumulated evidence reaches a threshold or bound. We propose that such a mechanism might play a more widespread role in the “piercing of consciousness” by non-conscious thought processes

Focus of attention modulates the heartbeat evoked potential

Theoretical frameworks such as predictive coding suggest that the perception of the body and world – interoception and exteroception – involve intertwined processes of inference, learning, and prediction. In this framework, attention is thought to gate the influence of sensory information on perception. In contrast to exteroception, there is limited evidence for purely attentional effects on interoception. Here, we empirically tested if attentional focus modulates cortical processing of single heartbeats, using a newly-developed experimental paradigm to probe purely attentional differences between exteroceptive and interoceptive conditions in the heartbeat evoked potential (HEP) using EEG recordings. We found that the HEP is significantly higher during interoceptive compared to exteroceptive attention, in a time window of 524–620 ms after the R-peak. Furthermore, this effect predicted self-report measures of autonomic system reactivity. Our study thus provides direct evidence that the HEP is modulated by pure attention and suggests that this effect may provide a clinically relevant readout for assessing interoception

Allostatic self-efficacy: a metacognitive theory of dyshomeostasis-induced fatigue and depression

This paper outlines a hierarchical Bayesian framework for interoception, homeostatic/allostatic control, and meta-cognition that connects fatigue and depression to the experience of chronic dyshomeostasis. Specifically, viewing interoception as the inversion of a generative model of viscerosensory inputs allows for a formal definition of dyshomeostasis (as chronically enhanced surprise about bodily signals, or, equivalently, low evidence for the brain's model of bodily states) and allostasis (as a change in prior beliefs or predictions which define setpoints for homeostatic reflex arcs). Critically, we propose that the performance of interoceptive-allostatic circuitry is monitored by a metacognitive layer that updates beliefs about the brain's capacity to successfully regulate bodily states (allostatic self-efficacy). In this framework, fatigue and depression can be understood as sequential responses to the interoceptive experience of dyshomeostasis and the ensuing metacognitive diagnosis of low allostatic self-efficacy. While fatigue might represent an early response with adaptive value (cf. sickness behavior), the experience of chronic dyshomeostasis may trigger a generalized belief of low self-efficacy and lack of control (cf. learned helplessness), resulting in depression. This perspective implies alternative pathophysiological mechanisms that are reflected by differential abnormalities in the effective connectivity of circuits for interoception and allostasis. We discuss suitably extended models of effective connectivity that could distinguish these connectivity patterns in individual patients and may help inform differential diagnosis of fatigue and depression in the future

Individual treatment expectations predict clinical outcome after lumbar injections against low back pain

Subjective expectations are known to be associated with clinical outcomes. However, expectations exist about different aspects of recovery, and few studies have focused on expectations about specific treatments. Here, we present results from a prospective observational study of patients receiving lumbar steroid injections against low back pain (N=252). Patients completed questionnaires directly before (), directly after (), and 2 weeks after () the injection. In addition to pain intensity, we assessed expectations (and certainty therein) about treatment effects, using both numerical rating scales (NRS) and the Expectation for Treatment Scale (ETS). Regression models were used to explain (within-sample) treatment outcome (pain intensity at ) based on pain levels, expectations, and certainty at and . Using cross-validation, we examined the models’ ability to predict (out-of-sample) treatment outcome. Pain intensity significantly decreased ()two weeks after injections, with a reduction of the median NRS score from 6 to 3. NRS measures of pain, expectation and certainty from jointly explained treatment outcome (). Expectations at explained outcome on its own () and enabled out-of-sample predictions about outcome (), with a median error of 1.36 on a 0-10 NRS. Including measures from did not significantly improve models. Using the ETS as alternative measurement of treatment expectations (sensitivity analysis) gave consistent results. Our results demonstrate that treatment expectations play an important role for clinical outcome after lumbar injections and may represent targets for concomitant cognitive interventions. Predicting outcomes based on simple questionnaires might be useful to support treatment selection